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PARMENIDES' WOUNDED HEART¹

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*"Tell my friends and companions
that I have done nothing weak
or unworthy of philosophy"*

(Hermias to Aristotle)

According to Mircea Eliade's *Phenomenology of Religions*, every creation myth in each primitive culture starts out as a paradigm to any invention of quasi-religious creed within said communities. This hermeneutical hypothesis has been explained and

¹ The author is indebted to Annita Tatsi and Raúl Vázquez, who kindly revised both the English vocabulary and the syntax of this article.

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illustrated outstandingly in Eliade's book *Myth of Eternal Recurrence*. There is no need to sum up what has become a turning point in philosophy of religion and comparative religion studies. I humbly refer the reader to this great little book.

This paper means to apply Eliade's hermeneutical hypothesis to the traditional division of Parmenides' heroic poem *On Physis*, namely: 1) The Way of Truth (Truth of Being/That Which Is), and 2) the Way of Appearance (in Parmenides' words: "and the beliefs of mortals, in which there is no true trust" (*pístis alethés*, 1.30)³). I intend to reconcile them without stripping them of their unique traits; by doing thus I found a Third Way which supports itself on both the validity and facticity of the former view. The Two Ways distinction is a logical one: although it stems from the incomplete poem as it has been reconstructed as well as its poetic language, it does not apply *sensu stricto* to *Physis*, or Reality, but rather applies *sensu latiore* to It⁴. Unfortunately, the traditional misreading of Fragment 3 as follows: "... for thinking and being are the same" (*tò gàr autò noein te kai einai*), has contributed to level Parmenides' contribution to philosophy into either a Berkeley-like idealism, or a forerunner of logical and mathematical axiomatic truths. During the last century, we learned of a more reliable rendering of Fragment 3, which is as follows: "... because the same thing is there for thinking and for being"⁵. But what is that "same thing"? Probably, That Which Is, or *tò eón (ens)*, viewed from Eliade's Eternal Recurrence.

Fragment 5.1-2, traditionally considered to be part of the Way of Truth, reads: "And it is all one to me / Where I am to begin; for I shall return there again"⁶. This is only understood by an Enlightened One⁷. The Goddess will teach Parmenides "the steadfast

³ D. Gallop, *Parmenides of Elea: Fragments*, Toronto-Buffalo-London, University of Toronto Press, 1991, p. 53.

⁴ "They examined the truth about existents, but they assumed the only existents to be sensible things" (Aristotle, *Metaphysics* Γ 5, 1010 a 1 [D. Gallop, p. 112]).

⁵ D. Gallop, p. 57.

⁶ Idem, p. 59.

⁷ "Si Parménides, con la identificación del eón y del nyn (DK B 8, 5: epei nyn estin homou pan...), ha querido expresar la 'eternidad del ser', es asunto de interminable discusión entre filólogos y filósofos. Con el 'Momento de Elea' me refiero, sin embargo, a la sugerencia de H. Fraenkel de que el poema de Parménides no sea sino la elaboración ontologizante de un instante de visión extática del UNO. Que ese instante, con la típica repentinidad (*exaíphnes*) de su impacto iluminatorio, haya constituido el punto de partida para la experiencia de la doble decisión (contra el no-ente, y contra la 'mezcla' de los 'bicéfalos') -siendo esta Krísis el momento más fatal de la ontología occidental

heart of persuasive truth” (or “rounded truth”, 1.29)⁸. This Truth-Heart is Sacred; like That-Which-Is, it is also *ásylum*, or a Refuge. Fragment 6.8-9, traditionally considered to be part of the Way of Appearance, reads: “By whom being” (*tò pélein*) “and not-being” (*ouk einai*) “have been thought both the same / And not the same; and the path of all is backward-turning”⁹, namely a vicious circle of the unenlightened. Although both share this circular trait, they differ in the individual capacity to learn the Goddess’ Wisdom. These two-rounded Ways are foreshadowed by Parmenides’ mention of the two well-rounded wheels of Helios’ Chariot (1.7 – Daylight as Being and Nightlight as Not-Being). This Not-Being is not *nihil privativum* but *nihil relativum*, because Parmenides has declared that moonlight consists of dimly reflecting sunlight. Both Ways are conceived harmonically as a dynamic *coincidentia oppositorum* whose functionality depends on not annulling each one’s typical and opposing traits. I then vouch for a third Way which symphonises the Way of Truth and the Way of Appearance at every Kairic instant, yet simultaneously retains their ranking order of Truth above Falsehood. The crucial verses are these ones: “But nevertheless you shall learn these things as well, how the things which / Had to have genuine existence, permeating all things completely” (1.31-32)¹⁰. Alfonso Gómez-Lobo has preferred to translate *dià pantòs* as meaning “at every moment” (“*en todo momento*”)¹¹. It looks like *Kairós* is latent *at this very moment*.

As an instance of this standpoint, allow me to point out Parmenides’ political contribution to his city of Elea; he authored its Constitution, a political application of his physiology bridging the ideal and factual aspects of its body of laws. In Parmenides’ Elean Constitution, virtuosity and conviction derive exclusively from his mythico-philosophical poem *De Natura*. This philosophical epic poem elaborates on his famous contribution to

(según Nietzsche)- es una hipótesis digna de ulterior elaboración, ya que el aspecto de crisis/discrimen pertenece al ámbito del Kairós” (M. Kerkhoff, *Kairós. Exploraciones ocasionales en torno a tiempo y destiempo*. San Juan, EDUPR, 1997, p. 171, n. 69).

⁸ D. Gallop, p. 53: “Since, then, there is a furthest limit, [it] is completed, / Form every direction like the bulk of a well-rounded sphere, / Everywhere from the centre equally matched; for [it] must not be any larger / Or any smaller here or there” (8.42-45; id., p. 73).

⁹ *Idem*, p. 61.

¹⁰ *Idem*, p. 53.

¹¹ “No obstante aprenderás también esto: cómo las apariencias / habrían tenido que existir genuinamente, siendo en todo (momento) la totalidad de las cosas” (1.31-32: *Parménides*, Buenos Aires, Ed. Charcas, 1985, p. 29).

his native polis with the efficacy of a creation myth related to any invention in a primitive society.

Parmenides, son of Pyres, came from Elea, a Greek colony in southern Italy, being the scion of a noble family. According to Plutarch (*Reply to Colotes* 1126 a), “Parmenides appointed for his native city” (*tèn heautou patrída diekósmese*) “the best laws” (*nómois arístois*), “so that every year” (*kath’ hékaston eniautòn*) “the citizens bind the magistrates” (*tàs arjàs*) “by oath to abide by Parmenides’ laws” (*emmenein tois Parmenídou nómois*)¹². W. K. C. Guthrie reports what Diogenes Laertius (9.23) says: “By a tradition going back to Plato’s nephew Speusippus, Parmenides was said to have been a legislator to whom Elea owed at least some of its laws”¹³. According to Guthrie, there is no good reason to doubt this political activity on the part of Parmenides, as it often occurs with other Pre-Socratic philosophers. For the current study, the most important remark pointed out by Guthrie comes next to the previous one: “E. L. Minar (*AJP*, 1949, pp. 41-55) suspects a connection between Parmenides’s political views and social position and his philosophical conceptions of being and seeming”¹⁴. Minar’s suspicion has become my conviction¹⁵.

Plutarch’s testimony quoted above includes the verb *diekósmese* and one of Parmenides’ verses reads: “All this arrangement” (*diákosmon*) “I proclaim to you as plausible” (*eoikóta*); / “Thus no opinion of mortals shall ever overtake you” (8.60-61)¹⁶. It is obvious that *diekósmese* derives from *diakósmos*. Parmenides’ Constitution reenacts his own *diákosmon eoikota*, not as a Way of Human Opinions in which there is no true belief,

¹² D. Gallop, p. 108.

¹³ “This is the native city of Parmenides and Zeno, the Pythagorean philosophers. It is my opinion that not only through the influence of these men but also in still earlier times the city was well governed” (Strabo, VI, 1, 1; D. Gallop, p. 108).

¹⁴ *A History of Greek Philosophy. The Presocratic Tradition from Parmenides to Democritus*, Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 1974, vol. 2, p. 2. Cf. E. L. Minar, *Parmenides and the World of Seeming*, *American Journal of Philology*, 70, 1949, pp. 41–55; Cf. ID.: *Early Pythagorean Politics in Practice and Theory*. Baltimore, Waverly Press, 1942.

¹⁵ Due to Jordi Marsal’s contribution to *Los filósofos y sus filosofías* (vol. 1, ed. by J. M. Bermudo, Barcelona, Editorial Vicens-Vives, 1983), namely, *Parménides, la filosofía en la democracia* (pp. 3-23), I learned of the political interpretation of Parmenides through Antonio Cappizzi’s, *Introduzione a Parmenide* (Roma, Editori Laterza, 1932). Martin Heidegger’s interpretations of Parmenides are also latent in my taking sides with Minar’s suspicion.

¹⁶ D. Gallop, p. 75.

but *the other way around*: Elea's citizens commanded their Magistrates to re-learn (at New Year's eve?!) how Parmenides' Laws ...: "Had to have genuine existence, permeating all things completely", all as part of a pledge of loyalty that was renewed annually. As Eliade has documented with textual proofs from many religious creeds, the reenactment of any main myth of creation, either theogony or cosmogony, was mostly carried out on New Year's eve. The advent of the new year and the reenactment of the myth of creation must coincide with each other. The myth makes sense to the ritual ceremonies; the rites channel the religious praxis and efficacy prescribed by the myth, whose "logic" mainly consists of evocative and symbolical (*apáte*) correspondences.

The name *arkhon* implies the pre-Socratic *arkhé* as meaning, beginning, foundation, and rule. The Magistrate-in-Chief was probably thought of as the *kouros* Parmenides initiated in the Mysteries¹⁷ of the Great Goddess. Thus, the *arkhon* reenacted Parmenides' Round Travel, and Elea's ruling class pledged annual allegiance to Parmenides' Laws. By this act, the Magistrate reenacts the Force of Faith or Conviction, twice mentioned in Parmenides' poem (1.30; 8.12-13; 28)¹⁸. Remember that the Way of Truth is the Way of Persuasion, for Persuasion follows upon Truth (2.4), just as *Peitho*, or *Suada*, follows upon Aphrodite or Venus. Truth persuades; Aphrodite seduces. Both rely on the *Lógos* inherent in their *dóxai* to lead (*agein*; *ducere*) a person or people. Parmenides' *aristoi nómoi* are like his *diákosmon eoikóta*, namely: *Tà dokímos dokounta sive dóxai eoikótes*. As a matter of fact, M. T. Cicero enlisted Parmenides as a sceptic philosopher¹⁹.

¹⁷ "The mares that carry me, as far as impulse might reach, / Were taking me, when they brought and placed me upon the much-speaking route / Of the goddess, that carries everywhere unscathed the man who knows" (1.1-3: D. Gallop, p. 49).

¹⁸ "Thus [it] must either be completely or not at all. / Now will the strength of trust (*pístios iskhús*) allow anything to come-to-be / Nor [its] perishing has Justice allowed, relaxing her shackles" (*pédeisin* (8.11-14: D. Gallop, pp. 65, 67). "Moreover, changeless in the limits of great chains (*megálon en peíراسi desmon*) / [It] is un-beginning and unceasing, since coming-to-be and perishing / Have been driven far off, and true trust (*pístis alhethés*) has thrust them out. Remaining the same and in the same, [it] lies by itself / And remains thus firmly in place; for strong Necessity / Holds [it] fast in the chains of a limit (*peíratos en desmoisin*), which fences it about" (8.26-31; ID., p. 69).

¹⁹ "Parmenides, Xenophanes, minus bonis quamquam versibus, sed tamen illi versibus increpant eorum adrogantiam quasi irati, qui, cum sciri nihil possit, audeant se scire dicere" (*Academicorum priorum*, 2.23.74). James S. Reid has commented: "Parmenides, Xenophanes: these are the last men who ought to be charged with scepticism" (*The Academica of Cicero*, London MacMillan and Co., 1874, p. 178).

Indeed, Hesiod's *Theogony* is the spiritual precursor of Parmenides' poem *On the Emergence of the Being of That Which Is*, especially in its so-called "Prologue" (B1). In Hesiod's *Theogony*, one of the first gods arisen out of Chaos is Eros; likewise, the very first being conceived by Parmenides' Goddess turns to be Eros. Parmenides seems to be talking of his Being/That Which Is as being Its *Asylum* (8.48)²⁰ for his Wounded Heart. Parmenides' *Heart* becomes *Hearth* as soon as Eros is engineered by the Goddess of his devotion. The Sacred Heart of Parmenides' Being/That Which Is aches in flames wounded by Eros' arrow.

Parmenides' Being is bound by chains, just as in Hesiod's *Theogony* Ouranos was fettered by Kronos, one of his sons. Those bounds are *Kairic ones*²¹. Athenagoras' *Legatio pro christianis* (22) witnesses to such a *Kairic* reinterpretation, at least *apud Stoicos*:

"Zeus is, according to the Stoics, the fervid part of nature; Hera is the air (*aér*) -the very name, if it be joined to itself, signifying this; Poseidon is what is drunk (water, *pósis*). But these things are by different persons explained of natural objects in different ways. Some call Zeus twofold masculine-feminine air; others the season which brings about mild weather, on which account it was that he alone escaped from Kronos. But to the Stoics it may be said, If you acknowledge one God, the supreme and uncreated and eternal One, and as many compound bodies as there are changes of matter, and say that the Spirit of God, which pervades matter, obtains according to its variations a diversity of names, the forms of matter will become the body of God; but when the elements are destroyed in the conflagration, the names will necessarily perish along with the forms, the Spirit of God alone remaining. Who, then, can believe that those bodies, of which the variation according to matter is allied to corruption, are gods? But to those who say that Kronos is time, and Rhea the earth, and that she becomes pregnant by Kronos, and brings forth, whence she is regarded as the mother of all; and that he begets and devours his offspring; and that the mutilation is the intercourse of the

²⁰ "...since [it] all inviolably is" (επεῑ παν̄ ἐστίν̄ ἀσὺλον, D. Gallop, pp. 72-73). Like temples where sacred refuge was used to be taken. Hence: "According to Parmenides the changeless and perfect spherical being [is god]" (Aëtius, 1, 7, 26; Dox. Gr., 303: ID., p. 114).

²¹ Parmenides' "shackles" and "chains" are *káiric ones*. "καίρια, ἡ. tape or cord used for ligatures, etc., Archig. ap. Orib., 47.13.7, Heraclisib. 48.1.1 (From κείρεσθαι or κáιρος according to Sch. Orib., 4 p. 537D.; cf. κείρια)" (H. G. Lidedell, R. Scott, H. S. Jones, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1940, *ad locum*).

male with the female, which cuts off the seed and casts it into the womb, and generates a human being, who has in himself the sexual desire, which is Aphrodite; and that the madness of Kronos is the turn of season, which destroys animate and inanimate things; and that the bonds and Tartarus are time, which is changed by seasons and disappears- to such persons we say, if Kronos is time, he changes; if a season, he turns about; if darkness, or frost, or the moist part of nature, none of these is abiding; but the Deity is immortal, and immoveable, and unalterable: so that neither is Kronos nor his image God. As regards Zeus again: If he is air, born of Kronos, of which the male part is called Zeus and the female Hera (whence both sister and wife), he is subject to change; if a season, he turns about: but the Deity neither changes nor shifts about”²².

In *De mensibus* (3.11), J. L. Ph. Lydus states that *Kairós* is the Paradigm of Time while not being Time itself; he adduces the following reason just before this statement: *Time is the Indefinite Ecstasy, [or Ecstasis], of Eternity*²³. Lydus reminds us of the definition of Time in Plato’s *Timaeus* and, at the same time, unveils what both Parmenides and Plato have witfully conceited by means of their very own *apáte*. Perhaps *Kairós* may be Parmenides’ *Physis* Paradigm, *Physis* being *Kairós*’ hideout.

Parmenides’ cosmogony and cosmology have been misunderstood as solely the Way of Appearance; provided that it is so, its legitimation stems from the Way of Truth; this constitutes a *paradigm* to the Way of Appearance. This Way of Appearance responds to the factual aspect of Parmenides’ Political Constitution; the Way of Truth backs up the ideal aspect, or validity, of the *corpus* of laws. Such cosmogony and cosmology, when understood as a Third Way, guarantee the validity and conviction of Parmenides’ laws to his *polis*. Parmenides’ Constitution *re-enacts paradigmatically* both the Way of Truth and the Way of Appearance; Elea’s political Constitution is a *re-enactment* of his philo-mytho-poetic poem. Parmenides culminates his philosophical fulfilment with a legal *praxis* incorporating his Hellenic and individual ideals of Justice. Remember that Dike and Themis play a most pivotal role as safeguards both of sacredness (or ritual-correctness) and

²² *A Plea for the Christians*, Ante-Nicene Fathers. Translations of The Writings of the Fathers down to A.D. 325, A. Roberts– J. Donalson (eds), New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1905, vol. 2, p. 140.

²³ “Post Kalendas autem reperimus multis modis tempus dividi in aevum (aeternitatem), in tempus, in tempestatem, in annum. Aevum igitur est infinita quaedam corporum (s. globorum) coelestium circuitus, sive ipsius universi coeli perfecta circulatio, tempus autem infinitus ex aevo progressus. Itaque etiam Krónos (id est, Saturnus) Urani (i.e. Coeli) filius vocatur; tempus enim (khrónos) ex coeli motibus prodit: ut tempestas temporis species sit, neque ipsum tempus” (Ioannes L. Ph. Lydus, *De mensibus*, 3.11 [*Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae*, B. G. Niebhur(ed.), Bonn, 1837, vol. 27, p. 38]).

equality-proportion. Dike is not a mere doorkeeper of the Goddess' abode: she leads the youngster Parmenides all through this *Daimon's* Way to Her Central and Pyric Mansion; moreover, Dike also *holds* in chains Parmenides' Being/That Which Is as to be perfected, rounded like his Persuasive, or Rounded, Truth.

Surprisingly enough, Plato never said of Socrates that he was his spiritual father. Although Socrates was his living teacher on philosophy and in almost every *Dialogue* he is the interlocutor and Plato's mouthpiece of his *idearium*, nonetheless Socrates was not proclaimed to be Plato's Father *in philosophis*. This honor was exclusively reserved to Parmenides. Parmenides' Third Way foreshadows Plato's *Mimesis* and the like. Any misreading of Plato's interrelation between the Intelligible and the Sensible will wrongly feedback on the traditional, misleading Two Ways Gap in Parmenides' philosophy. In his *Sophist*, Plato finally admitted Difference, Motion, Life and Soul to be dynamically present in the Realm of Forms; this was conceived after Parmenides' Third Way. They are neither Atoms nor Forms, but rather what makes it possible to conceive both of these things as different and same entities at once and alternatively, in themselves and reciprocally. The older Plato refused to join himself to the Friends of Forms party, and thus did to Parmenides the same thing he accused Aristotle of doing to him. The younger Plato kicked the she-goat Parmenides and killed her/him because the Eleatic one was mortally wounded by his own hands. Otherwise, Plato would have been unsuccessful.

Plato crowned his philosophy with a comprehensive political project mostly conveyed in his dialogues the *Republic*, the *Statesman*, and the *Laws*. Plato also tried to apply it to Syracuse, with a down-to-earth-minded aim to conquer Carthage, Greece's chief rival in the Mediterranean. Plato declares himself "Parricide" of Parmenides, and this has been possible because Parmenides had been mortally wounded by his very hands. The Venerable and Awesome Parmenides²⁴ had subtly distinguished between an assertion and its logical judgment: "Here I stop my trustworthy speech to you and thought / About truth; from here onwards learn mortal beliefs (*dóxas*), / Listening to the deceitful (*apatelòn*) ordering (*kósmon*) of my words" (8.50-52)²⁵. If this deceitful ordering of his words precedes and prepares his plausible arrangement (*diákosmon eoióta*), then *apatelòn* doesn't mean "deceitful", but rather "conceitful", as in a "witty expression". Stefano Arduini is quite right in supporting Simplicius' interpretation of Parmenides'

²⁴ "Plato, *Theaetetus* 183 e: [Socrates speaking] Parmenides seems to me, as Homer puts it, venerable and awesome. I met the great man when I was very young and he was very old, and he seemed to me to have a sort of depth which was altogether noble" (D. Gallop, p. 106.).

²⁵ D. Gallop, p. 75.

apatelòn kósmon not as *lógos pseudés*, but as an act of our creative intellect that transforms any intelligible realm of truth into its more plausible correspondence in the perceptual realm²⁶. Arduini argues that *Apáte*, Daughter of the Night, is an almost-truth. *Apáte* means “verisimilitude”. The possibility of *apáte* is a sign of the superiority of gods over men, it being an activity performed by *peíthein*, or persuasion. Arduini links *apáte* to *kairós*; the most fitting occasion for Parmenides’ *apatelòs kósmos* must be called *Kairós*²⁷. Parmenides’ Way of Truth “Now” (8.5) as the maximum time for Being/That Which Is (trans-temporal or a-temporal eternity [*Nunc Stans*?]), displays its corresponding counterpart in the Way of Appearance as the *Kairic*, i.e., conceitful and persuasive, representation, or reenactment (*mimesis*), of that which is alike both in time and in the cosmos: *Recurrence*. Needless to say, Plato’s conceits of *mimesis* and time as being a changing image of eternity stem from his pondering the interrelations between Parmenides’ Way of Truth and Way of Appearance. Plato realized it, but hid this distinction brewed by his Eleatic Father, who said it in enigmatical words²⁸, and Plato in the *Sophist* (261 c-264 c) fostered it conceitfully as his offspring, one of whose implications is for *Dóxa* to have been made a technical term for the logical judgment or proposition (*prótasis*, *axíoma*, *lógos*) of an assertion. This taking-over of that logical distinction was part of Plato’s plans to commit patricide against Parmenides.

²⁶ Parménides y la metáfora de las dos vías, Tonos Digital. Revista Electrónica de Estudios Filológicos, ISSN 1577-6921, núm. 1, marzo 2001 (<http://www.um.es/tonosdigital/znum1/estudios/stefano1.htm> [Saturday, 28 December 2013; 8:35 PM]). Cf. Logo: Revista de retórica y teoría de la comunicación, núm. 1, 2001, pags. 43-52 (<http://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=1199186> [Monday, July 7, 2014; 12:55 PM].

²⁷ According to E. Moutsopoulos: “The work of art, thus, becomes a ‘kairic’ opportunity and, in its turn, a starting point for such an ascent. This is valid not only for the visual arts but also for dramaturgy, poetry in general and music as well, in spite of Plato’s reticence (*in Rempublicam*, I, 50, 29-51, 5 Kroll)”. Moutsopoulos summarizes stating that: “Measure and kairós are essential criteria of successful imitation” (*Artistic Mimesis according to Proclus*, in *Philosophical Suggestions*, Academy of Athens, Research Centre on Greek Philosophy, 2013, p. 95). Moutsopoulos’ “káiric function” is to Being and Not-Being (ultimate extremes in Logic and Ontology), as *tò métron* is in ethics to the pair of extremes by excess and by default. Another plausible correlate is Plato’s Eros, offspring of Póros and Penía. Being neither Being nor Not-Being, Moutsopoulos’ *Káiric Thinking-Thought is a Function*.

²⁸ “Proclus, *Commentary on Timaeus* (Diehl, vol. I, 345): Parmenides, though he is unclear because of his poetic style, nevertheless himself says, to prove these things: [here Proclus cites a version of 1.29-30]” (D. Gallop, p. 109).

Like Hesiod's *Ouranos*, Parmenides' Being is bound, fettered, imprisoned and bleeding. Both have been castrated by one of their offspring. Martin Heidegger's witty expression of the ultimate Difference between Being and That Which Is (*Esse sive ens*) could be renamed sharply in Homeric Greek as such: *tò Káirion* sive *tà Káiria*. Parmenides likes to employ two verbs meaning "to be": 1) *to einai*, and 2) *to pélein*. The Ontological Difference abides not only the Being and That Which is Fold, but also in how and where Parmenides uses both copulative verbs. The first one expresses the logical truth of the judgment; the second one implies weather qualities associated with clouds. In today's Greek, "*Kairós*" means the *weather*; it also meant a *season of the year* in ancient Greek. For J. L. Kinneavy, "*Kairos*, lexically and conceptually, appears first in Homer's *Iliad*, where it denotes a vital or lethal place in the body, one that is particularly susceptible to injury and therefore necessitates special protection; *kairós* thus carries a spatial meaning"²⁹. Phillip Sipiora adds some key details:

In his 1923 treatment of *kairos* in classical Greek literature, "*Kairos* in Greek Literature", Doro Levi points out the term's etymological connections to "death", "ruin", "the seat of spiritual life", "to worry", "to care for", "to cut", "to kill", "to destroy". In Homer, according to Levi, *kairos* usually means "mortal", whereas in Theognis its meaning as "opportunity" begins to emerge, appearing later in the tragedies of Aeschylus. Passages from Euripides reveal the transition in meaning from Homer's "mortal" to the sense of "decisive" or "opportune", changes that occur in both verb and noun forms. From death or "truncation of life", the meaning shifts to decision or "truncation of doubt"³⁰.

The Difference between Being and That Which Is is given *káiric* folds, but never as a *Nunc Stans*. In Kierkegaard's terms, it could be renamed as *sickness into death*, the bottomless abyss for the ultimate *Epokhé* as, -in S. T. Coleridge's paraphrasis of Cicero's definition-, a "*willing suspension of all disbelief*" (*Biographia Literaria*, chapter XIV).

Just as Aphrodite bleeds *ichor* from her hand wounded by Diomedes, the Heart of Parmenides' Being (either *etor* or *thumós*)³¹ bleeds That Which Is. Ichor was brought forth

²⁹ *Kairos in Classical and Modern Rhetorical Theory, Rhetoric and Kairos. Essays in History, Theory and Praxis*, P. Sipiora – J. S. Baumlin (eds), Albany, State University of New York Press, 2002, p. 116.

³⁰ Introduction. *The Ancient Concept of Kairos*, op. cit., p. 6.

³¹ "Parmenides ... [says that] the mind is situated throughout the chest" (Aëtius IV, 5, 5; *Dox. Gr.* 391: D. GALLOP, p. 120).

by *Néktar* and *Ambrosia*, just as That Which Is came out of the proportioned mixture of Light and Darkness³², according to Parmenides' so called Way of Appearance. Parmenides' heart not only bleeds for his cherished city-state that he provided it with an excellent paradigmatic legislation; as a *physikós*³³ he made his patients bleed in order to cure them of their illnesses. Parmenidean *Physis* involves *Natura* and *Ars*; his eleatic *tekhné* culminates in a *politeía* that is a masterpiece of politics and jurisprudence. The *arkhon* of a polis is like a physician for his people, similar to how King Oedipus was to his subjects. It is indeed unfortunate to have lost Parmenides' Constitution to Elea! Last but not least, Parmenides' skilful art and craft as *physikós*, the ultimate stage in Pythagorean³⁴ discipleship (or a Master of his own) is clearly perceived in his composing a poem in hexametric verses, a worthy rival to Homer, the Greek Poet *par excellence*.

³² "Parmenides of Elea introduced fire and earth as gods" (Clement, *Protrepticus* 5, 64: D. Gallop, p. 115). "Parmenides [held that the basic elements are] fire to serve as a motive force, and earth to be formed by it" (Cicero, *Academica* II.118; ID., p. 116). "According to Parmenides it [the soul] consists of earth and fire" (Macrobius Commentary on *Scipio's Dream*, I, 14, 20; ID., p. 119).

³³ "Parmenides' activity at Elea has been found there on an inscription in the ruins of what was apparently a medical school of later origin (*Illustrated London News*, 31 August 1963, 306-7); he is referred to as a natural philosopher and a medical man. Later excavations have turned up a sculpture of his head in stone (*op. cit.*, p. 108) A. D. Trendall, Archaeological Reports for 1966-67, *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 87 1967, pp. 32-33" (D. Gallop, p. 108).

³⁴ "Zeno and Parmenides of Elea: they too shared the Pythagorean way of life" (*Photius, Bibliotheca* chapter 249, 439a [D. Gallop, p. 57]).